In re-examining the supply chain relationships of American firms, investigators usually confine their studies to the outsourcing strategies of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs
I C 1. Introduction t As the nineteenth century came to an end, the USA began its ascent as the t world's premier manufacturing nation. American entrepreneurs initiated this climb by first internalizing production and distribution functions previously 1 handled by the market and then by building vertically integrated firms to 3 coordinate the throughput of materials from suppliers to final distributors -| (Chandler, 1977) . In erecting these managerial hierarchies, usually in
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industries suitable for capital-intensive, high-volume production, America's corporate architects standardized production, developed uniform accounting procedures and divided the firm along functional lines, separating engineering design from manufacturing and management from labor (Kochan et al., 1986; Johnson and Mattson, 1987; National Research Council, 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) . Where production processes were not sufficiently specialized to justify their internalization, purchasing managers relied on spot market suppliers, encouraging competition to obtain the best possible deal (Williamson, 1985) . Before the Great Depression, America's efficient mass production system delivered low cost consumer and durable goods to a vast home market. This production system was a combination of global vertically integrated firms and homogenous component-part suppliers. Immediately after World War II, the USA retained its industrial lead as private and public investments in research and development and higher education pushed American firms into the new high technology industries of aerospace, electronics and computers (Nelson and Wright, 1992) . While engineers in these industries created new products through applied scientific research, managers acted less creatively when considering how to manufacture their new products. Managers found vertical integration to simply be the best available solution for coordinating the inputs and transformation processes of high-volume production (Putnam, 1985; Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986) .
Today, few contend that vertical integration offers the most efficient production system, even though the USA still preserves its overall lead in high technology industries (Nelson and Wright, 1992; Heye, 1993) . Too many challenges from foreign competitors-especially Japan-in industries such as automobiles, steel and consumer electronics have occurred. American firms have fallen behind because they were unable to reduce production costs incrementally and to improve product quality continuously (Dertouzos et al., 1989) .
These shortcomings have led many to a re-examination of supply chain relationships. Alternatives to vertical integration may be more conducive than American mass production to product and process innovation (Kamath and Liker, 1994; Nishiguchi, 1994; Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995) . In the automobile industry, one research group has described a Japanese alternative, lean manufacturing, as superior to America's mass production system (Womack et al., 1990) ; another research team, initiated by the US Air Force, has examined ways to develop lean manufacturing in the defense aircraft industry (Reynolds et al., 1995) .
Researchers investigating the supply chain literature usually confine their 724 studies to how original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) make organizational (governance) decisions. They answer questions such as: What advantages can you gain by having close relationships with your suppliers? What aspects of your product design, development, production and distribution are 'good' and 'bad' for you to outsource and why? How do you determine the 'core' and 'non-core' competencies of your business? The answer to these questions is that American OEMs rely increasingly on outsourcing. This is what is referred to as 'vertical disintegration'. A parallel, smaller literature has examined how small and medium size manufacturers (SMMs) fit within the vertical supply chain or 'web'. However, no systematic work has yet explored the strategic options that OEM outsourcing has fostered for SMMs. Usually, SMMs provide parts or materials to OEMs and they succeed or fail oh how well they serve their OEM customers. In this study, we explore how these suppliers develop new opportunities for increasing the volume and breadth of products which they source to OEMs and how these SMMs develop ways to collaborate with their OEM customers and manage appropriate technologies. We do this by first developing a strategic supplier typology. Transaction cost economics provides the conceptual basis for this typology, while a survey sample of 200 SMMs offers data to test the typology's validity. To demonstrate this typology's usefulness, we tell the history of an electronic parts manufacturer that has taken special advantage of OEM strategic outsourcing decisions within the computer industry. Clark and Fujimoto's (1991) study of auto manufacturers and their suppliers presents an interesting approach to classifying SMMs: according to Clark and Fujimoto, automotive OEMs (which have been prominent in the current 'vertical disintegration' trend) categorize their suppliers as black box, detail controlled and proprietary parts manufacturers. This categorization, while useful, has two limitations: it looks only at SMM strategies from an OEM perspective and provides only a sparse taxonomy of SMM strategies rather than a systematic typology. In this section of the paper, we address both of these limitations by creating a theory-based typology of supplier strategies and by empirically testing this typology with data from SMMs in a variety of manufacturing industries.
Background and Literature Review
A large and diverse literature on make-versus-buy decisions and buyer-supplier relationships exists. Because the competitive environment has 725 changed so dramatically for US manufacturers over the past two decades (Dertouzos et al., 1989; Woraack et al., 1990; Smitka, 1991) , both academics and practitioners have taken a new and energized interest in understanding how these decisions and relationships can be used to gain competitive advantage. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have responded to these pressures by rethinking their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Schoemaker, 1992) and re-examining their earlier make/buy decisions (Venkatesan, 1992; Walker and Poppo, 1991; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994) . A substantial number of OEMs have reconfigured themselves by strategically outsourcing to gain competitive advantage (Nishigushi, 1994) . Such practices have directly affected their SMM suppliers' strategies but, as yet, no systematic study of these options exists.
Within the corporate strategy literature, there are numerous reviews of methods of organizational classification (McKelvey, 1975; Carper and Snizek, 1980; Hambrick, 1983; Miller and Friesen, 1984; Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995) . Classification schemes have gained substantial popularity in developing analytical frameworks to understand how firms compete (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Miles and Snow, 1978; Galbraith and Schendel, 1983) . This literature has provided unambiguous definitions for two general forms of classification schema: taxonomy and typology. A taxonomy uncovers patterns within a set of variables creating interesting but theoretically unsupported clusters or groups. A typology begins with theory: it specifies combinations of variables for testing a priori generated conceptual types (Miller and Friesen, 1984, pp. 31-36) .
The make/buy decision has received much attention in the transaction cost economics literature (Williamson, 1985; Teece, 1986; Walker, 1988) . This literature has become extremely complex and controversial (Englander, 1988; Walker, 1988; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) ; but it still provides helpful theoretical constructs which we use to build a strategic supplier typology. Transaction cost economics says that the decision to vertically integrate depends on the relative monitoring costs that arise from the lack of perfect information (bounded rationality) and from the risk (uncertainty) which arises when the firm must trust a self-interested external agent (opportunism). These costs increase when the firm frequently requires large amounts of work for which specific assets are necessary. Divergent strategic interests require the use of complex and expensive governing procedures to monitor information and enforce promises. We recognize that many types of uncertainties [such as environmental, partnership and task in Bensaou and Venkatramen (1995) ] are identified in both the transaction cost (Cheung, 1983; Williamson, 1985) and organization theory literatures (Thompson, 1967; Milliken, 1987) . 726
However, we take the simpler approach and deal with all types of risk or uncertainty as a general problem of lack of information (asymmetry), as in Cheung (1983) , Coase (1988) and Fransman (1994) . We can translate these constructs into the familiar terms used in the study of vertical supply networks. Where transaction cost economics talks about asset specificity and increasing risk, strategic management substitutes the terms advanced technology and flexibility, which reduce risk (Rosenberg, 1961; Gerwin, 1993; Utterback, 1994) . Advanced information and manufacturing technologies allow suppliers to focus asset investments on specific customer needs. However, these new technologies may have broad flexibility which frees suppliers from being wholly dependent on a specific customer. The customer's risk is reduced as the new technology becomes widely dispersed among competing supplier firms (Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994) .
Where transaction cost economics talks about mutual dependence and thepossibility for opportunism, strategic management substitutes the potential for collaboration (trust) among customers and their suppliers (Axelrod, 1984; Smitka, 1991; Chiles and McMackin, 1996) . Recently, the strategic management literature has included many studies of specific methods which reduce information costs and facilitate trust between OEMs and suppliers. Value engineering provides a procedure by which the OEM and supplier can agree on cost reduction efforts and establish mechanisms such as target pricing to communicate systematic changes (Cole, 1988; Stevens, 1992) . Certification establishes a method by which OEMs and suppliers agree on the product and service aspects of their relationship: quality, delivery and terms (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1996) . Flexible technology and trust reconfigure the make/buy decision. This has allowed OEMs to engage in strategic outsourcing, which has created new business opportunities for SMMs. In the next section, we conceptualize a typology of strategies which defines the options available to SMMs.
Conceptualizing a Strategic Supplier Typology
The application of these theoretical constructs to the supply chain allows for the construction of a supplier typology. This typology divides along two dimensions: technology and collaboration. By dividing these dimensions into high and low categories, we create four distinct supplier strategies (see Figure  1 ). Quadrant I defines firms that use standardized technologies and relate to customers through standard market contracts. Typically firms in this space compete successfully on the basis of low cost: investments in advanced 727 technologies and managerial practices usually cannot be fully recovered. We label firms in this quadrant commodity suppliers (CSs). Quadrant II contains firms that use standardized technologies but develop enhanced skills and management techniques to make parts which meet customer specifications and delivery schedules. Because these firms remain under their customers' detailed control (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , suppliers in this quadrant invest few resources to innovate in product or process technology. We call firms in this quadrant collaborative specialists. 728 : -Quadrant III describes firms that employ advanced technologies and collaborative methods to promote innovations in product design and manufacture. Firms in this quadrant compete primarily on their ability to continuously acquire and evolve new ways to solve process and product problems (Gark and Fujimoto's black box suppliers). We call firms in this quadrant problem-solvers (PSs).
Quadrant IV includes firms that are adept at using technology to create unique products. These products are not necessarily designed to fit particular customer needs, however, and the firms must compete on their ability to develop proprietary products (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) . We call these firms technology specialists.
Operationalizing the Strategic Supplier Typology
To operationalize the strategies theorized above, we worked from experience and the literature on corporate and operations strategy. The collaboration dimension ranges from spot market arm's-length transactions on the low end to long-term relational contracts. The long-term relations include such practices as certification, target pricing, incentive contracts, and inter-firm concurrent engineering with both customers and suppliers. To facilitate these long-term external relationships, firms typically develop their own advanced management practices, which include strategic planning, quality practices and employee empowerment programs. The technology dimension ranges from firms which struggle to maintain routine manufacturing practices on the low end to firms which take advantage of advanced manufacturing and design technologies on the high end.
Based on these dimensions, we considered the implications to firms located in the different quadrants of the typology and developed four hypotheses. Because problem-solving suppliers (PSs) need to retain technical personnel to interact with their customers and to keep abreast of the latest technological developments, they will tend to have more employees, i.e. be of larger size (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991) . This leads to our first hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS 1. PSs will be larger-have more employees and greater sales volume-than suppliers using other strategies.
Because the new collaborative approaches and active technology involvement encourage more supplier innovation, problem-solving suppliers should generate higher profits. This is supported by the finding in von Hippel's (1988) study which indicates that firms innovate to secure 'quasi-rents', and by Helper and Levine's (1992) argument that OEMs and 729 suppliers collaborate in order to promote innovation and secure rents. This leads to our second hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS 2. PSs will be more profitable than suppliers using other strategies. Porter (1990) suggests that innovative firms compete more successfully in global markets than non innovative firms (Kanter, 1995; Rommel et al., 1995) . This leads to our third hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS 3-PSs will have a higher percentage of their sales in exports than suppliers using other strategies.
And finally, innovative firms require well-trained employees to continually improve products and processes. Porter (1990) also suggests that these firms will employ higher wage, higher skill laborers, which leads to our fourth hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS 4. PSs will pay higher wages than suppliers using other strategies.
While these hypotheses test only some selected characteristics of the strategic supplier typology related to problem-solving suppliers, they represent the main opportunities for SMMs created by OEM strategic outsourcing. These four hypothesized practices allow suppliers to continuously upgrade their skills and assets and develop effective bargaining power within the supply chain to gain their fair share of the profits and sustain competitor advantage.
The Survey
We could test these hypotheses through either observation or direct inquiry of firms. We chose direct inquiry and decided to use a telephone survey of SMM presidents and CEOs. The 'Quickview' survey developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's) Northeast Manufacturing Technology Center (NEMTC) and the New York State Department of Economic Development provided us with an instrument to collect data. Quickview asks questions about ten different aspects of firm operations: administration/management practices, human resources and personnel, market management, bidding/estimating and quoting, purchasing/vendor development, product design and engineering, operations management, manufacturing technology, maintenance/housekeeping, and quality management. A five point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (never/not at all) to 5 (always/to a great extent) is used to answer all perceptual questions. Some objective background questions are also included. To this extensive survey 730 instrument we added an addendum that asked 21 detailed questions about geographic proximity and relationships to both customers and suppliers.
The Sample: New Hampshire Manufacturers
To empirically test our typology, we selected New Hampshire as our sample population. New Hampshire provides appropriate data for study because it has led the USA in productivity growth between 1977 between and 1988 between (Sum, 1995 and virtually all this growth has been in manufacturing . Moreover, SMMs populate those industries which have led this exceptional growth. We used a telephone survey to gather data on 200 firms in the leading manufacturing industries in New Hampshire (fabricated metals, industrial machinery and equipment, electrical and electronic equipment and instruments) using the enhanced Quickview survey instrument. We only sampled firms with > 10 employees. This left a population of 423 firms which produced a response rate for our survey of nearly 50%.
Methodology
To test the typology we chose those variables from the Quickview survey which measure the use of collaboration and technology. We selected 26 'candidate' variables from the survey data to represent the collaboration dimension and 22 candidate variables for the technology dimension. We then analyzed this data using correlation analysis, contingency table analysis (cross-tabulation), analysis of variance (ANOVA) and simple descriptive statistics. Finally, to interpret the underlying multivariate relationship between the two dimensions of the typology, we used maximum likelihood factor analysis.
Correlation analysis is used to analyze the bivariate relationships among measured variables and factors constructed as linear combinations of the measured variables. We employed contingency table analysis on the variables and factors which were split at the median in order to compare the characteristics of those above with those below. For examination of the multiple levels of variables in the strategic supplier typology, we used ANOVA. Factor analysis was used to assess the presence of latent constructs in the measured variables. An oblique rotation was used rather than an orthogonal rotation because we wanted to know the degree of relationship (correlation) between the two dimensions. 731
Results

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
To construct the two dimensions, we summed the variables for collaboration and technology using equal weights. A strong positive correlation (r = 0.44, P = 0.000) exists between the two dimensions. This strong correlation supports our description of quadrant III: suppliers that develop collaborative relationships with their customers tend to be technologically sophisticated; suppliers that rely on normal market mechanisms to mediate their customer relationships tend to be less technologically sophisticated (quadrant I). Figure 1 gives the frequencies for all the firms on collaboration and technology scores. Sixty-five firms are in the PS quadrant (III) and 59 firms are in the CS quadrant (I). The remaining firms are distributed almost evenly between the other two quadrants. Both the Pearson chi-square and the Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association have values that are significant at <0.001.
Collaboration Factors
Next we factor analyzed the collaboration and technology variables to understand the underlying multivariate structure. The collaboration dimension reduced to five factors that accounted for 52% of the variance. These factors represent different aspects of both internal and external collaboration. Table 1 presents the factor loadings for this solution.
The first factor consists of ways in which firms communicate both internally between production and design personnel and externally with their customers on product and engineering design questions. This factor captures the use of cross-functional work teams both inside the firm and with customers. We call this factor early supplier involvement in product development, a process for developing new products which has received much attention lately (Cole, 1988; Fitzsimmons et al., 1991; National Research Council, 1991) .
We label the second factor strategic vision. This factor combines variables that describe how well a firm involves its employees in developing strategic plans and setting financial goals. The third factor describes how a firm relates to its primary customer and material supplier, i.e. it defines the attributes of collaboration 'upstream' (further from the final customer) in the value chain. Factor three shows that if a supplier's customer requires certification, the customer tends to use long-term contracts and target pricing. The SMM supplier tends to require certification of its own material suppliers. We call this factor customer/material supplier certification. The fourth factor has negative values on employee quality training and programs to develop supplier relationships. Firms that score high on this factor are unlikely to have high values on the first three factors. Factor four reinforces the importance of empowering employees through education/training in strategic management and quality practices, and developing collaborative supplier relationships. The fifth and last factor indicates that firms develop distinct relationships with their equipment suppliers. These relationships differ significantly from the types of interactions with their customers and material suppliers. These differences arise because most firms purchase major equipment infrequently. We call this factor equipment supplier certification.
Technology Factors
When we factor analyzed the technology variables, five new factors emerged (see Table 2 ). The first technology factor captures the importance of doing things right with your machines. It shows how a firm tracks machine downtime and idle time and how managers can use this information to improve machine operations. We label this factor expert machine utilization. The second technology factor identifies firms that design their own products with the use of computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided engineering (CAE) and then launch these products into production using complex planning/inventory control systems (MRP or similar). We interpret this factor to be an indicator of a firm's ability to do concurrent engineering and execute smooth ramp-ups of new products. We label this factor quality function deployment.
Factor three resembles factor one in that it establishes a measure for expert machine utilization. Factor three confines itself to procedures for operating metal-working equipment, specifically computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools. We call this factor process manufacturing know-how. As in our collaboration factor results, factor four has high negative loadings for only a few variables. These negative values pertain to machine downtime and idle time. A high score here suggests that a firm is not expert in machine utilization.
Finally, factor five provides information on the use of advanced manufacturing technology and procedures: programmable robotics, programmable controllers and statistical process control. We label this factor advanced process technology management. Managers use these technologies 735
to reduce variability in processes that already employ sound basic manufacturing practices. For this reason, we find the factor ordering to sequentially make good sense, i.e. good manufacturing practices precede advanced manufacturing technologies. Together these five factors account for >55% of the variance. Overall, looking at the strategic supplier typology matrix, we found the expected relationship between collaboration and technology. A firm with the administrative skills to enter partnerships was likely to have the know-how to manage advanced technology.
Testing the Hypotheses
We looked at supplier size based on both the number of employees and total sales. PSs have the largest number of employees (mean = 260), followed by collaborative specialists (mean = 150), technology specialists (mean = 44) and CSs (mean = 28). An ANOVA test produced an F ratio with a significance of 0.012, indicating that there are differences among the means for number of employees. Examination of the 95% confidence intervals for the means showed that all four quadrants were different from one another. The picture is slightly different for total sales. Collaborative and technology specialists are not significantly different from one another. However, the mean sales for both PSs and CSs differ significantly from the mean sales for collaborative and technology specialists. These results are supported by an ANOVA test with a significance of 0.011, indicating differences among the means for sales. Based on these results, hypothesis 1 is strongly supported for size of the firm expressed in number of employees, but must be qualified when using sales.
In our addendum to the Quickview questionnaire, we defined profitability as a firm's gross margin (over the past three years) compared to the industry's average gross margin. PSs do not significantly outperform firms in any of the other quadrants. However, PSs (and CSs) are more likely to have an average or above average relative gross margin than collaborative or technology specialists (see Table 3 ).
These tests give only weak support for hypothesis 2: although more profitable than collaborative and technology specialists, PSs are not significantly more profitable than CSs.
When we tested for exports (hypothesis three), PSs again did not significantly outperform their counterparts. However, the test was adversely affected by the export data's high variability (mean = 10.35, SD = 17.21). Still, when we compare the percentage of frequencies for each quadrant in Table 4 , we find that PSs performed quite well. Note that PSs (i) have the 736 
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To test for PSs' ability to pay higher wages (hypothesis four), we used hourly wage rates, which we divided into three levels: low (<$8.90), medium ($8.91-11.25 ) and high (>$11.26). We found that for PSs and CSs, wages are equal and higher than the average wage paid by either collaborative or technology specialists (Table 5) .
In summary, only our hypothesis regarding size provided a clear positive answer. For wages a somewhat more complicated picture emerged in that PSs and CSs do not differ significantly from each other, but do differ significantly from the other two quadrants. A comparison of the frequencies of firms in each quadrant for gross margins and exports provides some support for our hypotheses.
The Evolution ofHadco Corporation
In this section we present a case history to illustrate the 'robust' nature of our strategic supplier taxonomy. Unlike social scientists, historians, grounded in the humanities, do not seek to uncover 'laws' or predictable patterns. Rather, these humanists chronicle unique events, the complexities of which cannot be reduced to a few abstract propositions. Thus, historians resist social science categories because these tend to deny history's particularities.
We use our conceptual typology, substantiated by statistical tests, to provide themes for a story. Our challenge will be to maintain the story's complexity, its particularities, as we structure the narrative around our 738 classification schema. Consequently, we must warn that the story we tell has no inner dynamic, or teleology. The events we relate are the consequence of happenstance and managerial initiative rather than the predictable result of some technological logic or managerial dicta. We selected Hadco Corporation, one of the nation's leading printed circuit board (PCB) manufacturers, for our case study. Several reasons led us to select Hadco. First, it belongs to the survey data set in our New Hampshire industry group. Second, PCBs are an essential component in manufacturing computers and electronic equipment in diverse industries such as automobiles, consumer electronics, telecommunications and defense.
The PCB industry has been forced to adapt to the technological innovations that reshaped product competition in the computer industry. Firms that compete in manufacturing electronic components achieve competitive advantage by improving the electrical circuit designs etched into the PCBs. Japanese lean manufacturing in the auto, consumer electronics and other industries poses an additional competitive challenge.
PCBs serve as an important example in innovation research, von Hippel argues that firms innovate to secure higher profits and that those firms (e.g. users, manufacturers, suppliers) which functionally gain from these innovations tend to initiate the innovation (von Hippel, 1988) . In studying the PCB industry before 1988, von Hippel found that -70% of the innovations occurred among users (e.g. IBM, Wang) that made their own circuit boards and usually engaged suppliers to alleviate supplier bottlenecks associated with the business cycle. Thus, von Hippel's study provides an excellent reference point for our effort since we would expect Hadco to develop greater in-house capabilities as the large OEMs outsourced.
OEM manufacturing shows a growing trend toward outsourcing PCBs. As one of the nation's leading independent PCB manufacturers, Hadco affords an excellent example of how SMMs can profitable take advantage of OEM strategic outsourcing. Hadco began as a technology specialist, prototyping PCBs for large OEM customers. As the market expanded Hadco became a spot market manufacturer; and as the market contracted it became a collaborative specialist to retain market share. Finally, as strategic outsourcing opened new opportunities, Hadco drew on its past experiences to make itself into a problem-solving supplier, cooperating with OEMs in finding innovative solutions to product and process problems.
New England-based computer companies (Digital Equipment, Wang, Data General) were instrumental in pulling Hadco up the growth curve during the expansionary years between 1966 and 1985. Once harnessed to this new dynamo, Hadco had few important strategic decisions to make. In 739 1985, however, when the computer industry's phenomenal growth came to an abrupt end, Hadco's management faced a difficult strategic decision: to continue its high-volume, low-cost commodity strategy or to adopt product differentiation as a new strategic approach. Industry developments forced Hadco's management to adopt a differentiation strategy. In vigorously pursuing this strategy, Hadco's managers unexpectedly, but happily, found OEMs that wanted to enter 'partnerships' with specialized suppliers to both manufacture and design parts that the OEMs had previously done in-house. Hadco's managers quickly recognized that such alliances had profound implications. Hadco could no longer consider itself a spot manufacturer-even a high-end producer-that made PCBs to OEM specification. Instead, Hadco had to define itself as a problem-solver, helping its OEM customers improve the performance of their electronic components.
In 1985, to achieve this end, Hadco's managers put together a strategic plan to develop the technological, human and organizational resources to become a problem-solving supplier. Hadco made this transition by first passing through the other three stages: technology specialist, commodity supplier and collaborative specialist. Hadco's history thus neatly traverses each of our strategic typology cells. This movement, though contains no predictable pattern that others can imitate. Hadco's managers drew on their experiences and seized opportunities as market conditions shifted. Still, an account of these managerial experiences may provide ways for understanding the strategic options open to SMM managers as industries reorganize themselves.
From Technology Specialist to Commodity Supplier
Founded in Cambridge, MA near MIT in 1966 by three entrepreneurs, Hadco adopted a strategy of producing high-quality, quick-turnaround prototype PCBs, i.e. the company began as a technology specialist (see Figure 2) . These boards consist of nonconductive boards or panels (usually laminated epoxy glass) that hold bonded metallic patterns which interconnect electronic components both mechanically and electronically. These components are composed of a variety of semiconductor devices, such as transistors, rectifiers and diodes, capacitors and resisters, that affect the flow of electrical current.
When electrical engineers assemble two or more of these devices onto a base material, such as silicon, they become an integrated circuit (IQ. Once mounted on PCBs, ICs form electronic systems that are the basic building blocks for electronic equipment found in such diverse industries as computers, telecommunications, automotive and aerospace. Firms that compete in 740
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FlGUR£ 2. Hadco's progression through the supplier typology.
manufacturing electronic components achieve competitive advantage by improving the electrical circuit designs etched into the PCBs. Horace Irvine, the company's long time chairman, initially set the company's course. His experience as an account executive with Merrill Lynch and a production control and purchasing manager with a small PCB company gave him 'hands on' knowledge of the computer's enormous commercial potential and the opportunities that it would create for PCB manufacturers. In its early years, Hadco operated as a technology specialist providing local computer firms with high-quality, quick-turnaround (2-7 days) prototype boards. Hadco's OEM customers would supply Hadco with the design for an experimental board. At that time, PCBs were usually rigid, and single sided (i.e. its conductivity would be on one side and the drilled holes would not be plated) or double sided (i.e. its conductive pattern would be on both sides and drilled holes were generally plated through). Hadco would develop a prototype, assessing whether the PCB could be mass produced. If the prototype was promising, then the OEM would manufacture it in-house.
However, as the computer and electronic product markets burgeoned with the advent of the microprocessor, the demand for integrated circuits grew rapidly (see Table 6 ). With this growth, computer and electronic product companies had to look for PCB suppliers outside. Outsourcing usually involved orders for standard PCBs that were relatively easy to manufacture. By 1984 the PCB industry had grown to >2000 manufacturers. The industry divided into two types of producers: (i) captive manufacturers that operated 741 within large computer or other electronic equipment firms; and (ii) independent board suppliers. In 1979 captive producers accounted for 60% of production, which declined to only 40% by 1984.
Prior to 1984, large OEMs like IBM, Wang and AT&T used independent producers to smooth out capacity needs over the business cycle. During an expansionary period when the large OEMs could not produce enough to meet internal demand, they contracted with independent manufacturers to produce predesigned, relatively simple PCBs. Then, when demand slackened, the large OEMs canceled contracts with independent manufacturers and relied solely on their own in-house capabilities. At the same time,, in-house production allowed OEMs to reap higher profits from innovations in the design and manufacture of PCBs.
To maintain and improve profitability, OEMs could choose from three alternative strategies: by introducing new production technologies and/or materials; by modifying existing technologies and/or materials to produce new board designs; or by designing the innovation and then seeking small, independent PCB manufacturers who could mass produce the design. These new OEM demands gave independent suppliers the incentive to significantly increase capital investments and to seek process innovations (von Hippel, 1988; Department of Commerce, 1993) . Consequently, during the 1970s and early 1980s independent producers had two strategies from which to choose: to operate as a 'technology specialist' testing OEM design work or to function as a 'commodity supplier' mass producing standard types of PCBs.
As demand for PCBs increased during the early 1970s, Irvine transformed Hadco from a technology specialist into the industry's largest commodity supplier (Figure 2 ). Hadco's small-volume prototype business decreased relative to its high-volume production of single-and double-sided boards (Rasmussen, 1992) . For the most part, this change occurred as three fast growing local computer companies, Wang, Storage Technology ,and Digital Equipment, increasingly relied on Hadco for a large percentage of their PCBs 742 (Watts and Pompian, 1988 ) (see Table 7 ). Irvine made sure that Hadco took advantage of these opportunities and the company soon outgrew its operating facilities. The company grew from three employees and $100,000 in sales in 1966 to >2000 employees and ~ $126 million in sales in 1984. 
Experiments as a. Collaborative Specialist
Hadco experienced growth in sales during these years by becoming a commodity supplier and manufacturing a standardized, high-volume, low-value-added commodity. But, because of the industry's cyclical nature and its low entry barriers, Hadco competed fiercely. This competitive environment kept earnings flat even as sales exploded (see Table 8 ). This pressure and the industry's excess capacity in producing one-and two-sided boards forced Hadco's managers to look for an alternative strategy. Even as Hadco was developing into a commodity supplier, management experimented again, differentiating its product to protect the company from the vagaries of the market. These activities eventually remade Hadco into a problem-solving supplier, but it took nearly 15 years before Hadco's managers consciously instituted a strategy and a structure to bring about this metamorphosis. During this period, Hadco found an opportunity to protect its market position by re-emphasizing its specialized prototyping and preproduction capabilities. Hadco's managers sought to work closely with OEMs which used increasingly complex PCBs. By entering a collaborative relationship, i.e. by 743 adopting a collaborative specialist strategy, Hadco's managers hoped to gain a window on technological innovations to understand the emerging trends in product development. OEMs had by then crafted multilayer PCBs (von Hippel, 1988) . These boards could contain as few as four or as many as 20 layers. By layering boards through conductive or nonconductive holes, this new design process increased a printed circuit's speed while decreasing its size (Balog and Macnguyen, 1989) . This improved efficiency permitted greater design density and product improvements in the computer industry. Because the new multilayering process required sophisticated engineering and production skills as well as heavy capital investments, Hadco's managers believed that if Hadco collaborated in prototyping and preproduction of this process and its products, Hadco could erect effective entry barriers (Watts and Pompian, 1988 ). Hadco's managers believed these barriers would be more effective because collaboration would allow Hadco to remain in touch with a technology that continued to shorten product life cycles. As part of this strategy, Hadco's managers sought to diversify into other industries by transferring its know-how to noncomputer firms that used PCBs and wanted close relationships with a technologically advanced supplier.
Over the next seven years, Hadco worked to become a collaborative specialist by investing in complex technologies and by instituting administrative methods to work closely with its customers. Hadco expanded its manufacturing facilities for multilayer PCBs when it acquired a new factory in Owego, NY and two PCB manufacturers, Circuit Image Industries and Qualitron Corp. With Qualitron, Hadco purchased the most advanced manufacturing equipment for arraying pins on PCBs. In turn, this equipment positioned Hadco to sell its products to OEMs that were using a new technology, surface mount. Surface mount technology allows a company to create circuit boards on which electronic components, such as microchips, could be placed on the circuit board's exterior, yielding denser designs than with the conventional multilayer techniques. 744
Hadco invested heavily in upgrading its marketing and technical capabilities. It sales and service organization was enlarged and reorganized to assure customer communication. In this way, Hadco aimed at becoming a market driven rather than an engineering-driven firm. Hadco complemented this move into customized products by developing a division to manufacture backplanes, specialized multilayer circuit boards that connect a series of logic boards. Thus, Hadco gained an appreciation of the functional design relationships among the component parts that went into its customers' final product (National Research Council, 1991) .
To anticipate customer need, Hadco built two Technology Centers, one in Salem, NH and another in Watsonville, CA. These Centers prototyped complex designs to customer specifications and modified them for mass production. This interaction between design and manufacturing helped Hadco improve the management of its production facilities. Finally, in 1983, to assure laminated board supplies, Hadco vertically integrated by purchasing Laminated Technology, Inc.
Although Hadco vigorously pursued the acquisition of equipment and expertise for the manufacture of multilayer integrated circuit boards, the company continued to concentrate its efforts on boards that involved less than 8 layers and required conventional machinery to mass produce. At the same time, Hadco continued to operate in the single and double PCB markets. By 1984 Hadco no longer operated as a pure commodity supplier, as the company had developed sophisticated marketing skills and employed more advanced technologies (primarily in the two Technical Centers) than the company had five years earlier. Hadco now had the organizational capability to stay abreast of OEM technological innovations that increasingly shortened product life cycles, particularly in the computer industry.
Hadco had emerged as a collaborative specialist (Figure 2 ). The company manufactured goods according to customer specification and refrained from functional design work. The Technology Centers, where Hadco did its most advanced work, operated as technology specialists, verifying customer prototypes for mass production. By 1984 Hadco had taken significant steps toward becoming a collaborative specialist as a way to master the industry's business cycles. They had evolved from one customer representing 41% of their sales in 1984 to no single customer exceeding 10% of total sales in 1992.
Hadco's organization structure still conformed to its basic commodity supplier strategy. Hadco functioned as a holding company where profitability came principally from each profit center's ability to gain scale economies. Irvine oversaw this mechanistic organization which inhibited cross-functional collaboration both within Hadco and between Hadco and its customers. Hadco remained primarily a computer parts supplier, selling 79% of its products to the computer industry (Balog and Macnguyen, 1989) . Hadco was still a dependent supplier (see Table 9 ). Nonetheless, Hadco's management had confidence in their ability to continuously gain control over the business cycle. In 1984 the company made an initial public offering. The financial markets confirmed their optimism as the offering netted Hadco $12.9 million on 1.3 million shares (Watts and Pompian, 1988) . However, this confidence was quickly shattered when one of Hadco's largest customers, Storage Technology, filed for bankruptcy in October 1984. Storage Technology accounted for 18% of Hadco's sales. This event by itself would have badly damaged Hadco's position, but Storage Technology's difficulties marked the end of the phenomenal growth of the mainframe and minicomputer segments. Two of Hadco's three main customers experienced sharp declines in net income.
The computer market's collapse dramatically affected Hadco's performance: consolidated net sales went from a 1984 record high of $125 million to $86 million, leaving Hadco with a loss on continuing operations of $4.7 million. Hadco's greatest losses occurred in double-sided PCBs, for which three customers-DEC, Wang and Storage Technology-had accounted for 49% of total sales in 1982.
OEM Strategic Outsourcing: Hadco Becomes a Problem-solver
The computer industry's sharp decline forced Hadco's management once again to find measures for handling downturns in the business cycle. 746
However, this crisis proved so severe that Hadco's board of directors had to take decisive action and rethink its strategy of becoming a collaborative specialist. The board recognized that the firm's competitive advantage derived from its ability to work with customers in prototyping and manufacturing multilayered PCBs. This advantage, however, seemed insufficient to ward off the damaging effects of the downturns in the business cycles. Consequently, the board, under Irvine's leadership, took a bold step: they decided to concentrate on high-end products that required design as well as manufacturing sophistication. Hadco's managers would now have to develop the company's capabilities to innovate to meet customers' needs. In asking Hadco's managers to carry out this new strategy, the board reaffirmed its earlier commitment to broaden the corporation's customer and industry base.
Hadco's managers now had to think of themselves as problem-solvers who collaborated with customers in finding functional design solutions to OEM product and process problems. In so doing, Hadco's management team recognized that they would have to continuously improve their product and process technologies as well their administrative procedures. Hadco summarized its new strategy as follows: 'We must be more than a supplier. We must solve customers' problems through creative, "hands on" collaboration. Rapid response to customer needs is our obsession ' (Hadco, 1993a) .
To achieve these ends, Hadco's managers faced difficult organizational challenges. Reorganization proceeded incrementally for the next five years. The initial architecture came from Jon Kropper, who joined Hadco as President and CEO in October 1985. Until then, Irvine had led the firm as a traditional entrepreneur, seizing market opportunities and building formal structures that reinforced strong centralized decision-making (Grenier, 1972; Churchill and Lewis, 1983) . Kropper, a former executive vice-president with Wang Laboratories, wanted to transform Hadco into a decentralized firm, one that would give managers the financial and technical freedom to remake Hadco into a problem-solving supplier. To obtain the necessary financing for the transition, Kxopper sold off the company's vertically integrated units and a number of investments designed to penetrate international markets. Kropper divested Hadco's wholly-owned subsidiary, Lamination Technology, sold off its 49% interest in SA Comelin and closed Qualitron (Watts and Pompian, 1988) . As a result of these and other cost-saving measures, Hadco's employment fell from 2126 to 1215. The resulting cash infusion helped maintain Hadco's solvency and permitted Kropper to proceed with his reorganization plans. 747
Strategic Outsourcing in the Computer Industry
As Kropper began to refashion Hadco as a problem-solving supplier, the company's large OEMs simultaneously went through a restructuring process that encouraged strategic outsourcing. Later Hadco discovered that its own downswing portended revolutionary changes in the mainframe and minicomputer markets. Wang's difficulties offer the best preview of the industry's future. Wang built its phenomenal success on developing dedicated products for small end users, first in calculators, then in word processing and minicomputers (Kenney, 1992) . The company's founder, An Wang, insisted that these products be proprietary, that they work exclusively with other Wang products. A Wang word processor, for example, only operated with Wang software and a Wang printer. By locking-in customers, Wang gained high profits from its proprietary system. However, this strategy made Wang vulnerable to general purpose equipment that could perform multiple functions and that operated with an open system that allowed customers to mix and match from the best products on the market.
IBM introduced this product in 1981 with its Personal Computer (PC) and quickly eroded Wang's market share (Kenney, 1992; Ferguson and Morris, 1994 ). IBM's PC won market share because it functioned as a stand alone computer that could execute multiple functions. Apple had already demonstrated how advances in microprocessing made possible a general purpose, decentralked computer. IBM's revolutionary contribution resided in the PC's open system. Rather than building the PC from in-house production units, IBM outsourced nearly all of the PC's components. In part, IBM chose this strategy to reduce the time it took to bring this new product to market. By relying on suppliers which had manufactured high-quality, reliable components, IBM did not have to acquire in-house the equipment and skills needed for this new venture.
IBM's executives had a strategic reason for adopting this outsourcing policy. They believed that the PC could set the industry standard if its specifications were accessible. Third parties would produce an array of add-ons from software to modems that would spontaneously provide users with a wide variety of products and this demand would assure PC market dominance (Kenney, 1992; Ferguson and Morris, 1994 ).
IBM's open system strategy worked as expected and fundamentally shifted the way computer companies competed. No longer could firms hope to achieve dominance through proprietary systems where all components were manufactured in-house or subcontracted to specification. Under the open system, computer companies had to learn how to achieve leadership in those 748 component parts-particularly microprocessors and operating systems-that define a computer's standards and protocol for processing data. Standards and protocol define a computer's basic architecture, to which others must adapt in manufacturing components or add-ons (Brock, 1990; Verity, 1992; Ferguson and Morris, 1994) .
In this highly competitive environment, it no longer made sense for a company to produce each part of the computer system. Now, managers had to decide where their firms had unique skills to win and sustain an architectural lead in the computer's basic design. Managers of vertically integrated firms quickly began to outsource much of the work they had formerly done in-house in order to concentrate on the firm's core competencies. Wang refused to consider an open architecture that would allow for this kind of interchangeability and this decision proved disastrous.
Because computer OEMs were strategically outsourcing and developing new governance rules through the use of long-term contracts and certification programs, Hadco sought to take on more responsibility for improvingPCB design and process technologies. The OEMs found it strategically cost effective to let sophisticated suppliers both invest in the latest production technologies and devise ways to improve performance. Solong as the OEMs had governance mechanisms to coordinate suppliers.they only needed design engineers to work with suppliers to meet functional design requirements. Process innovation thus moved down the value chain.
Strategic outsourcing did not remain confined to the computer industry. Other US industries faced their own competitive problems that did not arise solely from technological advances. Japanese firms had adopted lean manufacturing techniques that emphasized strategic outsourcing. In automobiles, consumer electronics, office products and communications, companies were imitating Japanese manufacturers and learning to compete on both quality and price. All of these changes offered Hadco important opportunities if it could manage the transition to a problem-solver.
Making Hadco a Problem-solver Under Kropper's leadership, Hadco took the first steps to reorganize itself to take advantage of these opportunities. Having salvaged the corporation from near bankruptcy through downsizing in 1985, Kropper began to invest in new capital equipment to meet customer needs. By 1990, the company had spent $54.4 million or 8% of net sales on new capital equipment, compared with an industry average of 5.9% (Rosenberg, 1982; Rasmussen, 1992) .
In 1985, Hadco purchased Caratsch hot air leveling equipment that 749 soldered coat mask over bare copper printed circuits at high volume in high quality lots. In 1986 the company installed the CIBA-GEIGY Probimer Process System at the Owego plant, and at the Deny plant in 1988. This allowed for finer line drawings in producing double-and triple-track circuits, and for components to be surface mounted on either side of the circuit board. Together, finer line drawings and surface mount brought about a 60% reduction in board size and a 90% saving in board weight. Along with these savings came higher board performance and reliability as well as greater opportunities for automation and cost savings. Hadco made additional gains by installing computer-aided inspection equipment to verify that products met design specifications and by purchasing advanced drilling machines to make the smaller, denser holes required for surface mount technology {Standard and Poors Industrial Survey, 1992) .
Kropper recognized that this capital investment would be worthless unless Hadco satisfied its customers' increasingly sophisticated needs. To understand these needs and to communicate them to Hadco's design and production teams, Kropper upgraded Hadco's communications capabilities in 1985 by installing proprietary software to receive electronically printed circuit designs and drill tape data. As part of this program, Hadco made major investments in CAE equipment that improved PCB manufacturing yields. By 1986, Hadco had installed computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) equipment to assure that the company could provide support to customers in designing PCBs. Through these investments, Hadco shortened the time from prototyping to mass manufacture of a new PCB (Watts and Pompian, 1988) .
Simultaneously, Kropper upgraded the company's sales force. In 1985 manufacturing representatives accounted for 64% of Hadco's sales; by 1990 this number changed to 29%. The change occurred as Hadco added 15 employees to its direct sales force, bringing the total to 28 in 1990. At the same time, Hadco established seven regional sales offices to develop closer customer contact. In each of these centers, Hadco assigned a technical specialist to act as liaison between the customer and Hadco's manufacturing executives.
As Hadco upgraded its sales operations, the company gradually became less dependent on customers in the computer industry. By 1992 Hadco had 39 major OEM customer partnerships in industries that required sophisticated electronics, chiefly industrial automation, instruments and communications (Hadco, 1993b) . Total sales to computer companies fell from 79% in 1984 to 49% in 1992. In 1992 no single customer exceeded 10% of H,adco's sales (Table 9 ). With this diversified customer base, the company found that OEMs 750
were demanding improved buyer-supplier relationships through certification programs. These formal documentation programs forced Hadco to continuously upgrade its operating policies and procedures, and to meet stringent quality and delivery requirements (Hadco, 1993b) . To make sure that its Technology Centers functioned as early warning stations for customer needs, Hadco provided these Centers with the latest process equipment. These strategic investments in process technologies and customer service forced Kropper to restructure the firm. The first step was to decentralize decision making authority from Irvine to the technical managers. From 1985 to 1987, Kropper created the position of Vice President for Technology Development, replaced executives in finance and international production, and elevated human resources from a staff to corporate executive function. Pat Sweeney took over as Vice President of International Manufacturing after leaving a similar position at Wang in 1986; he would become CEO in 1991.
Together, these strategic investments and structural reforms produced results that Hadco could boast about in its 1988 Annual Report. The company cited three examples of how Hadco had recreated itself as a problem-solver, collaborating on early functional design work with its customers and responding quickly to customer need.
Hadco first described its work with Stromberg-Carlson. This large electronics firm had given up producing circuit boards and had elected to work with Hadco in manufacturing PCBs for the switches that StrombergCarlson sold to its telecommunications customers. This decision to outsource came as Stromberg-Carlson augmented the density of its PCBs to meet sophisticated telecommunications customers' demands. Although an important input to Stromberg-Carlson's switches, its managersfound that investments in the equipment needed to produce multilayer PCBs did not add strategic value to the company. Consequently, Stromberg-Carlson worked with Hadco's engineering and purchasing teams to adapt StrombergCarlson's designs to Hadco's Ciba-Geigy Probimer process.
Similarly, Honeywell developed a collaborative relationship with Hadco after reassessing its make/buy decisions and reducing its supplier base. Hadco developed a close working relationship with Honeywell's Industrial Programmable Controls Operation, so close that Honeywell viewed Hadco as an extension of its own operations. The two companies melded their engineering, quality control and materials groups to ensure that Hadco delivered defect-free products on time.
Finally, Hadco cited its relationship with Tandem Computers as an example of Hadco's improved capacity to meet customer needs rapidly. Here, Hadco did not 'partner' with Tandem as a problem-solver, but instead demonstrated 751
its new prowess to act flexibly and quickly when Tandem made an order for a large number of complex PCBs with a short lead time. Successes such as these, however, were not enough to convince Hadco's Board that Kropper had fully restructured the company. Kropper had proven himself an adept turnaround manager and able administrator who had moved Hadco from an entrepreneurial to a managerial run company that was on the path toward becoming a problem-solver. Also, Hadco's cross-functional cooperative relationship with Honeywell had set an example of successful collaboration. Hadco's organization, however, made it difficult to repeat this success story on a regular basis. Kropper's reforms remained mired in an older paradigm where technology and administrative innovations like just-in-time were used solely to enhance productivity. Hadco had not moved to make use of the company's new technologies and managerial practices to educate the firm's employees in how to anticipate customer needs and stay ahead of technological and market changes. Indeed, managers still felt part of a top-down organization waiting for Kropper to set policy. Hadco remained a hierarchical company divided along business segment and functional area lines; hierarchy inhibited managerial entrepreneurship while divisions fostered rivalries that worked against cross-functional teams (design, engineering, marketing) vital for concurrent engineering. If rivalry hindered internal cooperation, it also placed barriers on establishing interfirm cross-functional design teams that enabled early supplier involvement in their customers' new product development efforts (Rasmussen, 1992) .
Developing a Problem-solving Culture
The Board recognized that to move forward, Hadco had to have a more people-oriented, less autocratic manager at the helm. As a result, the Board promoted Pat Sweeney to CEO in 1991. To remake Hadco into a problem-solver, Sweeney initiated a cultural revolution that broke with the traditional hierarchical structure of the firm and fostered development of a learning environment (Senge, 1990) . Sweeney advocated a two-pronged approach: he set out first to develop a common vision and second to educate managers and employees in total quality management (TQM). Through a vision statement, Sweeney hoped to identify the cultural changes needed to build collaboration within the firm. By introducing TQM, Sweeney expected to upgrade Hadco's employees' skills. By integrating the employee commitment to Hadco's future with employee commitment to continuous learning, Sweeney hoped to create an environment that would foster 752 HADCO win set the standard for excellence in serving the global electronics industry;
Our Customers' Standard Quality and service will be our hallmark. We will understand OUT customers' future technology requirement and be ready to support them through continued involvement and joint development activities. Our customers will say of us, "They listen."
The People Standard
We will attract the best people and encourage them to think and act like owners/entrepreneurs. We will give our people the tools and training they need to provide exceptional customer service.
The Financial Standard
We will earn consistently superior returns. Our investments will focus on people and assets that enhance shareholder value.
The Management Standard
Our approach and attitude will be balanced and consistent. We will create an atmosphere that provides continual challenge, rewards tied to performance, and opportunities for growth.
Our Suppliers' Standard
We will maintain an environment based on ethics, honesty, and professionalism. We will cultivate strategic alliance with key suppliers. The results will be continuous improvements in customer service and greater financial stability for ourselves and our supplier-allies.
The Standard for Responsiveness and Innovation
Our customers, employees and the communities in which we work will think of us as leaders -always honest and always reliable.
Our quest will be a quality transaction in everything we do. Our customer, employees and shareholders will be more than satisfied -they will be delighted! mass-produced products on time. But Hadco had to go beyond meeting the customer's current needs; it had to be able to recognize the customer's latent needs, i.e. to deliver a service or product that the customer did not currently demand but would value when offered. To adapt the infrastructure that Kropper had put into place to Hadco's vision statement, Sweeney initiated a TQM program throughout the company. Sweeney hoped that TQM would rapidly bring more customer information into the firm and provide training in how to assemble and operate the cross-functional work teams needed to solve the customer's problem and refashion Hadco's process technology. Sweeney felt that TQM would force Hadco's employees to learn to continuously improve their practices. By setting incremental goals, Sweeney recognized that employees would collectively develop routines to enhance performance. He hoped that by working together on problems, employees would develop an appreciation for learning, one that would truly make Hadco a problem-solving organization. As part of the TQM implementation effort, Hadco instituted a certification program and supplier symposium for its material and equipment suppliers in 1992 (Hadco, 1993a) . Certification assured Hadco quality parts, timely delivery, the possibility for additional technical inputs in solving customer design problems and long-term reduced costs (Walker et al. y 1994) . In short, Hadco's PS strategy to be successful had to extend to its own specialized supplier base.
By 1992, Hadco had made sufficient strides toward becoming a learning organization that Sweeney felt confident in beginning to make structural reforms. Sweeney maintained the firm's basic divisional structure but imposed on it cross-functional teams that focused on quality and operational processes. At the top of this new structure stood a Corporate Steering Committee, comprising senior managers and the divisional/functional vice presidents. This Committee oversees the TQM process which now formally has a steering committee in each divisional and functional unit. Continuous Quality Improvement Teams (CQIls) report to these steering committees. The CQITs come together as multi-functional units to address specific customer problems.
As part of this, effort, Hadco established a five-member Corporate Development Project Team 'to improve the product and process development cycles with Hadco's customers' (Hadco, 1993c) . This team evaluates customer requests and technology changes before prototyping or manufacturing, and works on corporate approved projects. In 1992 the Team focused on fine pitch surface mount technology, tape automated bonding and via hole technologies of less than 0.005' width.
Overall, Sweeney established what Hadco called a 'pipeline management' structure; it assured that customer problems flowed into the company, reaching the appropriate work/design teams and Hadco's specialized supplies, and flowed back through the production process to deliver a product that met the customer's needs (Rasmussen, 1992) . This structure reinforced Hadco's capital investments in CAE and CAD/CAM, which gave the potential to satisfy the needs of both existing and new customers. Taken together, Hadco's commitment to invest in the latest technology, to establish customer/supplier partnerships and to use advanced human resource practices formed a triangular policy by which Hadco defined itself as a problem-solver. To measure its success as a problem-solver, Hadco benchmarked its performance internally and used OEM certification standards, the Baldrige Award Criteria and the IPC Industry Association as external benchmarks (Strout, 1993) .
Even though Sweeney focused the company on people and systems improvement in building Hadco as a problem-solver, the company did not fully achieve its objectives. Management readily acknowledges that more employees, particularly production workers, need to be involved in the planning process and in cross-functional and quality improvement teams. Furthermore, management has not found ways to evaluate fully performance on a team or process basis while rewarding individual productivity.
A more important challenge for Hadco has been how to respond to OEM strategic outsourcing. Hadco's customers now expect Hadco to be simultaneously a leader in PCB technology and a responsive manufacturer of complex, high-volume PCBs. Such expectations require resources, particularly R&D expenditures and expertise, that surpass a medium sized firm's capabilities. To operate at this level of sophistication, Hadco has had to leverage itself by partnering with other firms, including competitors, and public institutions on specific projects (Lietz, 1993) . Managing strategic alliances has become a new task that Hadco's managers must master.
Conclusion
Hadco's history illustrates the various strategies that component part manufacturers have available to them in this era of strategic outsourcing and vertical disintegration. Over a period of nearly three decades, Hadco demonstrates all four strategies suggested by the strategic supplier typology developed from the survey data of 200 SMMs. Each of the strategies has administrative and organizational aspects that make it unique. While these strategies could easily be captured under the generic rubric of low cost or 755 differentiation, each one has administrative and organizational qualities that make it unique. While Hadco's organizational alterations and the new responsibilities that go with its current problem-solving strategy may be novel, the general proposition that structure follows strategy still remains valid. Hadco's managers identified alternative strategies as opportunities presented themselves and reorganized their firm accordingly. These actions did not occur because of some predetermined technological vector; instead, Hadco's managers identified how technologies opened up business opportunities and acted on these insights, helping to shape product development.
Even if we do not offer a technological argument or suggest that any linear pattern exists among the supplier typology quadrants, managers can learn from Hadco's actions. Hadco's success tells us that firms can do well when they know that strategy suits their particular circumstances. For instance, commodity suppliers do not spend money on technology or organizational development unless they intend to transform themselves; collaborative specialists spend money to improve their organizational effectiveness, not to hire more technology expertise.
Hadco's story also suggests that survival in a strategic outsourcing environment requires suppliers to hone competency skills and organizational forms that allow for adaptation and quick response to customer demands. One way of doing this is by developing inter-organizational linkage, networks, partnerships or strategic alliances with the value chain with customers and suppliers, and outside the value chain with competitors and educational and governmental institutions. Problem-solvers provide the highly specialized knowledge which can handle messy design-throughmanufacturing problems as a single turnkey step.
